Monday, February 21, 2011
Paris 1919
Just finished an excellent and accessible account of the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 by one Margaret MacMillan, last noticed on June 7th last year. I think I must have been moved by turning over the pages of the other book - 'Dangerous Games' - once again to get this one. Something called a trade edition from Random House which has been printed on unusually cheap paper and which would have benefited from maps which fold out for viewing while reading and a diagram of the timetable.
On the first point, perhaps de-luxe editions, of which this was not one, should come with a little packet of maps to be consumed in parallel with the book, rather than building inferior maps into the book. Alternatively, the publisher could put a selection of suitable maps up on a web-site. Or a CD. Not as convenient as paper but better than an atlas. An atlas is a necessarily blunt & often heavy instrument and the maps need to be tailored to the book. I should say that the maps in this book were satisfactory although they could have been bigger and better; the problem was getting at them.
On the second, MacMillan chose to present the large amount of material by losing part. So we have chapters on Bulgaria, Turkey, China and so on. But what we gain in comprehension about the problem of China we lose in grasp of the process as a whole: the problems were all being dealt with in parallel, many of what were thought of as small problems in the margins of what were thought of as large problems, but there was too much going on for this reader to be able to grasp the whole.
The book and the peace is enlivened by all kinds of tittle-tattle about the players. Their lives and loves. One hopes that most of it is true. It would be annoying to find later that the book was merely reproducing the ill-informed gossip of the day.
I share various other bits and pieces. With, of course, the advantage of nearly a century of hindsight.
Anglo Saxons sometimes make the French out to be the villains of the peace. Greedy and vindictive. But this book reminded me that the US had little to fear from troubles in Europe and the UK was protected by its navy. And we had already impounded the German navy, merchant marine and colonies, so we had got what we wanted. The French, following the devastation of northern France, were simply anxious to avoid a repetition of what had happened to them twice in living memory. What became thrice in living memory for some of them. On this book's account, the Italians were far worse than the French.
And we were careless enough to let the German admiral scuttle his fleet in Scapa Flow as a gesture of defiance when he learned of the terms of the peace. The US was probably pleased rather than otherwise that the UK did not get to get this useful addition to its navy. They were as keen to get to be in charge of the seven seas as they are to keep charge now.
Some of the smaller players, very hot on self detirmination when it came to getting their own independance, were sadly indifferent to the rights of others and generally greedy when it came to settling boundaries. The Poles and the Czechs being examples.
Also true that self detirmination was an insufficient criterion for the invention of new countries. Much of Central Europe was terribly mixed up and one also had to have regard to viability, transport and security. Railways and junctions seemed to be of great interest. The Clapham Junctions of Central Europe had to find good homes. Altogether too much for the peace makers of the day to cope with. We solved some of these problems after the second world war by going in for large scale ethnic cleansing. After the first world war that only happened between Turkey and Greece - after the Greeks overreached themselves.
There might have been some hope for Palestine, what is now Israel, if we had managed to make the whole of Syria independant, that is including what is now Lebanon, Jordan and Israel. A large and strong Syria might have been able to make room for minorities - to the benefit of all. A hope which was very much alive when Weizmann first met Feisal but which was snuffed out when we snuffed Feisal. Figuratively, of course.
The US was already starting to worry about Japanese power at this time, despite their being on our side and having provided useful naval support during the height of the German submarine campaign. Part of their reward was a whole bunch of islands in the Pacific, in some of which they built large naval facilities before the second war. Which then had to be reduced at great cost.
All in all a rather shabby peace. But better than those that had gone before, and probably much better than that which the Germans would have imposed had they won. They were fairly fierce after the 1870 war and looked set to be more so had they won the 1914 one. Furthermore, natural justice had a voice for the first time at such an event, even if it did not prevail. And although it gave the Germans debating points, it did not cause the second war. Apart from the Germans themselves, that was more to do with the various weaknesses & errors of those who won the first one.
On the first point, perhaps de-luxe editions, of which this was not one, should come with a little packet of maps to be consumed in parallel with the book, rather than building inferior maps into the book. Alternatively, the publisher could put a selection of suitable maps up on a web-site. Or a CD. Not as convenient as paper but better than an atlas. An atlas is a necessarily blunt & often heavy instrument and the maps need to be tailored to the book. I should say that the maps in this book were satisfactory although they could have been bigger and better; the problem was getting at them.
On the second, MacMillan chose to present the large amount of material by losing part. So we have chapters on Bulgaria, Turkey, China and so on. But what we gain in comprehension about the problem of China we lose in grasp of the process as a whole: the problems were all being dealt with in parallel, many of what were thought of as small problems in the margins of what were thought of as large problems, but there was too much going on for this reader to be able to grasp the whole.
The book and the peace is enlivened by all kinds of tittle-tattle about the players. Their lives and loves. One hopes that most of it is true. It would be annoying to find later that the book was merely reproducing the ill-informed gossip of the day.
I share various other bits and pieces. With, of course, the advantage of nearly a century of hindsight.
Anglo Saxons sometimes make the French out to be the villains of the peace. Greedy and vindictive. But this book reminded me that the US had little to fear from troubles in Europe and the UK was protected by its navy. And we had already impounded the German navy, merchant marine and colonies, so we had got what we wanted. The French, following the devastation of northern France, were simply anxious to avoid a repetition of what had happened to them twice in living memory. What became thrice in living memory for some of them. On this book's account, the Italians were far worse than the French.
And we were careless enough to let the German admiral scuttle his fleet in Scapa Flow as a gesture of defiance when he learned of the terms of the peace. The US was probably pleased rather than otherwise that the UK did not get to get this useful addition to its navy. They were as keen to get to be in charge of the seven seas as they are to keep charge now.
Some of the smaller players, very hot on self detirmination when it came to getting their own independance, were sadly indifferent to the rights of others and generally greedy when it came to settling boundaries. The Poles and the Czechs being examples.
Also true that self detirmination was an insufficient criterion for the invention of new countries. Much of Central Europe was terribly mixed up and one also had to have regard to viability, transport and security. Railways and junctions seemed to be of great interest. The Clapham Junctions of Central Europe had to find good homes. Altogether too much for the peace makers of the day to cope with. We solved some of these problems after the second world war by going in for large scale ethnic cleansing. After the first world war that only happened between Turkey and Greece - after the Greeks overreached themselves.
There might have been some hope for Palestine, what is now Israel, if we had managed to make the whole of Syria independant, that is including what is now Lebanon, Jordan and Israel. A large and strong Syria might have been able to make room for minorities - to the benefit of all. A hope which was very much alive when Weizmann first met Feisal but which was snuffed out when we snuffed Feisal. Figuratively, of course.
The US was already starting to worry about Japanese power at this time, despite their being on our side and having provided useful naval support during the height of the German submarine campaign. Part of their reward was a whole bunch of islands in the Pacific, in some of which they built large naval facilities before the second war. Which then had to be reduced at great cost.
All in all a rather shabby peace. But better than those that had gone before, and probably much better than that which the Germans would have imposed had they won. They were fairly fierce after the 1870 war and looked set to be more so had they won the 1914 one. Furthermore, natural justice had a voice for the first time at such an event, even if it did not prevail. And although it gave the Germans debating points, it did not cause the second war. Apart from the Germans themselves, that was more to do with the various weaknesses & errors of those who won the first one.
# posted by Jim @ 12:01 AM 
